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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, the statutory regulation of the relationship between broadcasters and candidates for elective office is an
example of congressional commitment to democracy. Through
Section 315(a) of the Communications Act-the anti-censorship
provision-Congress has attempted to level the playing field for
all legally qualified candidates for office.' Section 315(a) allows
for the presentation of candidates' unvarnished positions on issues
t First Place, Open Competition Law and Policy Division, Broadcast Education
Association, Las Vegas, Nevada (1993).
* Ph.D.; Visiting Assistant Professor of Telecommunication, College of Journalism
and Communications, University of Florida, Gainesville. Bitnet: MRivera@
Nervm.Nerde.ufl.edu.
** Member, Louisiana Bar; Ph.D. student, University of Florida, Gainesville.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988) provides:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section.
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important to the voting public. Democracy, however, is not always
pretty.
Often, political issues of public interest and concern are
couched in offensive or racially charged language. In fact,
broadcasters' concerns over the content of political advertisements
are not new. In the late 1950s, the concerns centered on whether
licensees could be held liable for defamatory statements made by
a candidate in a political ad.2 Two major cases occurred during
the 1970s. In one, a civil rights group asked the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to banish the word
"nigger" from the airwaves, 3 and another requested that broadcasters eliminate racial slurs from political advertisements.4 In the
1980s, employees of a radio station were concerned that a
candidate's use of the word "bullshit" in the course of a political
ad could offend members of the audience.5
In the 1990s, the ads that caused the collision between
political candidates' interests and those of broadcasters have
centered around abortion, perhaps the most divisive social issue of
the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically, in 1992, the ads for Republican
congressional candidates Michael Bailey of Indiana and Daniel
Becker of Georgia contained graphic pictures of aborted fetuses. 6
The abortion ads were broadcast during the early afternoon and
prime time. One broadcaster, fearing public outrage, asked the
FCC to (1) declare ads containing abortion pictures indecent and
(2) allow broadcasters to channel political ads containing pictures
of aborted fetuses to hours when children were less likely to be in
the audience.'

2. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
3. See Letter from Wallace E. Johnson, Chief, BC, to Julian Bond, Atlanta
NAACP, 69 F.C.C.2d 943 (1978).
4. See Letter from Ben F. Waple, Secretary, to Lonnie King, Atlanta NAACP, 36
F.C.C.2d 635 (1972).

5. See In re Complaint of Barry Commoner and LaDonna Harris Against NBC
Radio, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
6. See Joe Flint, Graphic Political Spots Bedevil Stations, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Aug. 31, 1992, at 6.
7. See Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to Vincent A. Pepper, Esq.,

Counsel, Gillett Comm. of Atlanta, Inc., 7 FCC Rcd. 5599, 5599 (1992).
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The FCC has defined indecency as "language that describes,
in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory
activities or organs. ' In order to protect children from indecent
material, the FCC has traditionally channeled indecent programs
to the late hours of the evening. This period, known as "safe
harbor," begins around midnight.9
Broadcasters, who for years have been fighting the FCC's
attempts to regulate indecency, asked the Commission to declare
graphic depictions of aborted fetuses "indecent."'" The broadcasters' central concern appeared to be that if they showed
pictures of aborted fetuses at times when children may be in the
audience and those pictures were indecent, the FCC could hold

8. In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM0, N.Y.,
N.Y., Memorandum Opinion and Order,56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 12 (1975), quotedin FCC
v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978).
9. The FCC has been involved in an intense anti-indecency campaign since 1987
and the "safe harbor" has been the subject of FCC, congressional, and judicial debate
and actions. For an account of the changes in the regulation of indecency since 1987,
see John Crigler and William J. Byrnes, Decency Redux: The Curious Historyof the New
FCC BroadcastIndecency Policy, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 329 (1989).
The period during which it is safe to air indecency is itself the subject of
controversy. From 1978 to 1987, it was from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.; after a series of FCC
actions in 1987, the FCC attempted to change the start of safe harbor to midnight. See
In re Infinity Brdcst. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,3 FCC Rcd. 930, 937-38
n.47 (1987). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, however,
struck down the midnight safe harbor in Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 852 F.2d
1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (ACT 1). After several other legal maneuvers, see Action for
Children's TV v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (ACT I), cert. denied sub nom.
Children's Legal Found. v. Action for Children's TV, 112 S. Ct. 1281, and cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992), it was unclear what time was safe for the broadcast of
indecency. In order to avoid problems, the FCC decided not to punish indecent programs
from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. until clear rules that did not conflict with the court decisions in
ACTI and ACTII were instituted. In 1992, however, Congress passed the funding bill
for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which included a midnight safe harbor. See
Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949,
954. In November 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, acknowledging
the government's compelling interest in protecting children from indecency, ruled that
the midnight to 6 a.m. safe harbor restriction was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
survive constitutional scrutiny, but the decision was vacated when the court granted
rehearing. Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (ACT II),
vacated and reh'g granteden banc, No. 93-1092, 1994 WL 50415 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16,
1994).
10. Letter from Roy J. Stewart to Vincent A. Pepper, supra note 7, at 5599.
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stations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, the indecency statute."
The controversy over the use of abortion pictures in political
ads does not end there. While Section 312(a)(6) of the Communications Act 2 states that a station may lose its license for violating Section 1464-which punishes the use of obscene, indecent,
or profane language over the airwaves-Section 315(a) forbids any3
censorship of political advertisements, and Section 312(a)(7)1
requires that broadcasters give candidates running for federal
office reasonable access to their stations or risk losing their
licenses. The conflict between these three statutes has caused
confusion and concern among broadcasters and raised questions
that have not yet been answered conclusively.
For example, if a federal candidate chooses to use graphic
depictions of aborted fetuses in campaign ads and those pictures
were declared indecent, would the channeling of the ads be a
violation of Section 312(a)(7), 315(a), or both? If the pictures
were indecent and broadcasters aired them as required by law,
would broadcasters violate Section 1464 and Section 312(a)(6) of
the Communications Act? Or does the anti-censorship clause of
Section 315 protect them from liability? Finally, where does the
First Amendment stand among these conflicting interests?
These are just some of the questions that the current controversy over political advertising has raised. Although this Article
cannot answer all of them, the importance of the issues outlined
above requires that an attempt to do so be undertaken.
Part I of this Article will focus on the law governing political
advertising, specifically the reasonable access requirement for
federal candidates, Section 312(a)(7), and the anti-censorship
provisions of the political advertising rules, Section 315(a). Part
II will look at the law regulating broadcast indecency, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 and 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6), which has been the main
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.").
12. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (1988).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988).
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weapon broadcasters have used in their attempt to channel
abortion political ads to hours when children are least likely to be
in the audience. Part III will examine the use of abortion pictures
in ads by political candidates and the controversy and reactions
such ads have stirred. Finally, Part IV will review the constitutional and statutory implications of the proposed channeling of
indecent political advertisements.
I.

STATUTES GOVERNING POLITicAL BROADCAST ADVERTISING

Two sections of the Communications Act, Sections 312(a)(7)
and 315(a), generally control political advertising over the
broadcast media for federal candidates. Section 312(a)(7), known
as the "reasonable access rule," allows the FCC to impose the
"death penalty," or license revocation, for willful failure to make
time available for purchase by federal candidates. 4 The FCC has
interpreted the reasonable access rule to require that broadcasters
accommodate the requests of individual candidates for airtime to
the maximum extent possible.1 5 Likewise, the FCC has said that
reasonable access requires that broadcasters provide access to
candidates during prime time. 6
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the reasonable access rule. In CBS, Inc. v.
FCC,7 the Court said that once the political campaign began,
broadcasters had to consider each request for time from a federal
candidate and make a reasonable effort to accommodate it.' The

14. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988) (providing for revocation of a license "[f]or willful
or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable
amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified candidate for
Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy").
15. See Political Brdcst. and Cablecasting, Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476, para. 73
(1984) (quoting Use of Brdcst. and Cablecast Facils. by Candidates for Pub. Office,
Public Notice, 34 F.C.C.2d 510, 536 ("The Commission will not substitute its judgment
for that of the licensee but, rather, it will determine in any case that may arise whether
the licensee can be said to have acted reasonably and in good faith in fulfilling its
obligations under this section.")).
16. Id. para. 74; In re Commission Policy in Enforcing § 312 (a)(7) of the Comm.
Act, Report and Order,68 F.C.C.2d 1079, para. 40 (1978).
17. CBS, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
18. Id. at 387.
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case involved a request to the networks from the Carter-Mondale
campaign to broadcast a thirty-minute documentary approximately
eleven months prior to the election. While CBS offered five
minutes of prime time, both NBC and ABC said they were not
ready to sell any time for the 1980 campaign at such an early
date.19
The networks argued that the FCC's decision that the CarterMondale campaign had been denied "reasonable access" interfered
with the editorial decisionmaking of broadcasters.20 But the
Supreme Court said that broadcasters who adopted blanket policies
denying access to candidates were in violation of the reasonable
access rule.2 ' Thus, while a blanket policy was likely to be more
convenient for broadcasters, the Court said compliance with
Section 312(a)(7) required that broadcasters take into account the
campaign needs of federal candidates.22
Once a station has complied with the requirements of Section
312(a)(7) and agreed to make time available, it then faces the
strict requirements of the anti-censorship rule of Section 315(a).
This section prohibits the broadcast licensee from censoring
material submitted for broadcast by the candidate.23 Even if the
material contained in the ad is libelous, the Supreme Court has
ruled that a licensee is prohibited from deleting it. In Farmers
Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.,24
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that WDAY, a small radio station
in rural North Dakota, could not delete Union references to certain
government officials as "Communists." The Court said that
"permitting a broadcasting station to censor allegedly libelous
remarks would undermine the basic purpose for which [Section]
315 was passed-full and unrestricted discussion of political issues
by legally qualified candidates."25 Since broadcasters were legally

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 389.
47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).
Farmers,360 U.S. 525 (1959).
Id. at 529-30.
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bound by the anti-censorship provision, the Court affirmed the
FCC interpretation that compliance with Section 315(a) granted
broadcasters immunity from liability for any statements made by
political candidates.26
Similarly, if after agreeing to provide a candidate with
broadcast time a station learned that the candidate's appearance
would involve the expression of highly inflammatory or extremely
unpopular points of view, the station could not then refuse to carry
the candidate's material. In 1972, the FCC denied a request from
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) that broadcasters be allowed to reject political ads that
contained the word "nigger" and other highly offensive language.27 The NAACP claimed that the ads of J.B. Stoner, a selfproclaimed white supremacist, posed an "immediate threat to the
safety and security of the public. ' 28 The NAACP argued that
since stations airing Stoner's ads had allegedly received bomb
threats, avoiding the broadcast of racially charged advertisements
was the "responsibility of [a] licensee under the public interest
standard. '29 The FCC denied the NAACP request, citing Farmers
as precedent, and declared that after an investigation there was no
evidence that stations had actually received bomb threats.3" Thus,
said the Commission, there appeared to be no clear and present
danger of imminent violence. The FCC concluded by saying that
a "contrary conclusion would permit anyone to prevent a candidate
from exercising his rights under Section 315 by threatening a
26. Id. at 533.
27. Letter from Ben F. Waple to Lonnie King, supra note 4.
28. Id. at 635. The text of J.B. Stoner's ad was as follows:
I am J. B. Stoner. I am the only candidate for U.S. Senator who is for the
white people. I am the only candidate who is against integration. All of the
other candidates are race mixers to one degree or another. I say we must
repeal Gambrell's civil rights law. Gambrell's law takes jobs from us whites
and gives those jobs to the niggers. The main reason why niggers want
integration is because the niggers want our white women. I am for law and
order with the knowledge that you cannot have law and order and niggers too.
Vote white. This time vote your convictions by voting white racist J. B. Stoner
into the run-off election for U.S. Senator. Thank you.
Id. at 636.
29. Id. at 635.
30. Id. at 636-37 n.1.
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violent reaction."31 The Commission also ruled that "the public
interest is best served by permitting the expression of any views
that do not involve 'a clear and present danger of serious substanrises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
tive evil that
, 32
unrest. '
In 1978, after the U.S. Supreme Court decided FCC v.
33 Julian Bond, of the NAACP, asked the
Pacifica Foundation,
FCC to declare the word "nigger" obscene, thus preventing the
word from being used over the airwaves.34 In Pacifica, the
Supreme Court affirmed an FCC ruling that declared a George
Carlin monologue containing the words "shit, piss, flick, cunt,
cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits" '35 indecent. The FCC had

defined indecency as "language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs. 36
The Court's decision allowed the FCC to regulate the times at
which indecent words could be used on the air in order to protect
children.
The NAACP petition erroneously construed the Supreme
Court decision to declare Carlin's seven "dirty" words "obscene"
rather than "indecent." The FCC denied the NAACP's request,
saying the word "nigger" did not fit the definition of indecency
advanced in Pacifica.37 Moreover, the FCC said that "even if the
Commission were to find the word 'nigger' to be 'obscene' or
'indecent,' in light of Section 315 we may not prevent a candidate

31. Id. at 637.
32. Id. (quoting In re Complaint of Anti-Defamation League ofB'nai B'rith Against
Station KTYM, Inglewood, Cal., Memorandum Opinion, 4 F.C.C.2d 190, 191 (1966),
aff'd sub nom. Anti-Defamation League ofB'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969)).
33. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

34. Letter from Wallace E. Johnson to Julian Bond, supra note 3, at 943.
35. Pacifica, 438 U.S. app. at 751.

36. Id. at 732 (quoting In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station
WBAI (FM), N.Y., N.Y., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 12

(1975)).
37. Letter from Wallace E. Johnson to Julian Bond, supra note 3, at 944.
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from utilizing that word during his 'use' of a licensee's broadcast
facilities."38
In a 1980 case, Citizens Party presidential and vice-presidential candidates Barry Commoner and LaDonna Harris asked NBC
Radio to air an ad that contained the word "bullshit."39 Commoner and Harris filed a complaint with the FCC alleging that NBC
Radio had violated the anti-censorship provision of Section 315.
Commoner and Harris claimed that an NBC employee rejected the
ad, and it was not until after the advice of NBC's legal counsel
that the station agreed to run the commercial.4 °
Although the FCC found that NBC had not violated Section
315(a), the Commission said the "initial reactions of the NBC staff
in rejecting the spot and urging its modification were clearly in
' Thus, the Commission warned NBC to ensure that its
error."41
staff was aware that political ads could not be censored even if
offensive language was used.
II. BROADCAST INDECENCY: A KNOTrY PROBLEM
Section 1464 restricts the broadcast of "indecent" material. If
a broadcast licensee violates the indecency statute, Section

38. Id.
39. In re Complaint of Barry Commoner and LaDonna Harris Against NBC Radio,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
Man:
Bullshit.
Woman: What?
Man:
Carter, Reagan and Anderson. It's all bullshit.
Barry: Too bad people have to use such strong language. But isn't that what
you think, too? That's why we started an entirely new political party.
The Citizens Party. The truth is we've got to break the power of the
big corporations. Profit-oriented corporate decisions have left the rest
of us with high inflation, nuclear insanity, and a poisoned environment This is Barry Commoner. I'm the Citizens Party candidate for
President, along with LaDonna Harris, our Vice-Presidential
candidate. We'll be on the ballot in 30 states. If we can poll just 5%
in this election, we'll get millions in federal funding to organize for
the next election. Why not vote for us, Barry Commoner and
LaDonna Harris.
Id. app. A at 7.
40. Id. para. 3.
41. Id. para. 11.
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312(a)(6) of the Communications Act empowers the FCC to
revoke the license.
The standard used to regulate indecency comes from FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation.42 As stated above, in Pacifica the U.S.
Supreme Court held that comedian George Carlin's monologue
Seven Dirty Words was indecent. For the nine years following the
1978 Pacifica decision, the FCC generally took no action against
broadcasters for indecency violations. Meanwhile, broadcasters felt
that airing indecent material between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. was
"safe" because there was less risk that children would be in the
audience.43
In a series of rulings in 1987, however, the Commission
revived its regulation of indecent speech and greatly broadened the
scope of its applicability.' The new indecency policy reached
beyond the "seven dirty words" listed in Pacifica, and included
material that fit the general definition of indecency. The FCC also
ruled that the beginning of the safe harbor should be moved from
10 p.m. to midnight.45
On June 1, 1987, the National Association of Broadcasters
and other groups filed a petition for clarification of the rulings.46
On December 29, the Commission acknowledged that the
regulation of indecent material was a sensitive task due to the
42. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
43. Young listeners or not, the broadcast of obscene material is prohibited at all
times. The basic guidelines followed in identifying obscenity are set out in Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973):
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.
Id. at 24.
44. See In re Infinity Brdcst. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,2 FCC Red.
2705 (1987); In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2
FCC Red. 2703 (1987); In re Pacifica Found., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order,
2 FCC Red. 2698 (1987); New Indecency Enforcement Stds. to Be Applied to All
Brdcst. and Amateur Radio Licensees, Public Notice, 2 FCC Red. 2726 (1987).
45. In re Infinity Brdest. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,3 FCC Red. 930,
937-38 n.47 (1987).
46. Id. para. 30.
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possibility of infringement on the broadcasters' First Amendment
rights.47 The Commission said, however, that it had an obligation
to enforce the indecency restrictions, and that by enforcing Section
1464, it was advancing the government interest in protecting
children from offensive material and allowing parents to decide
what children would see or hear.48
In 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit struck down the "channeling" provision of the
FCC ruling. In Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT
1),49 the court upheld the Commission's power to prohibit
indecent broadcasting during the day and to expand the scope of
what constituted indecency. However, the ACT I court held that
the FCC lacked evidence to support the change of the 10 p.m. safe
harbor."
The reaction from Senate conservatives was swift. Senator
Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) pushed a bill through Congress ordering the
FCC to draft regulations for a twenty-four-hour ban on indecency.5" As required, the Commission drew up a regulation to
enforce the legislation," but the regulations were quickly challenged by broadcasters and stayed by the courts while the
Commission collected public comment. 3 After the comment
period, however, the FCC again announced a twenty-four-hour
ban, which was challenged by broadcasters. 4 In 1991, the D.C.
Circuit Court declared the 'round-the-clock ban unconstitutional
in Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 11).55 The ACT

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. paras. 7, 10.
Id. at 937-38 n.47.
Action for Children's TV, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1341-44.

51. See Dennis McDougal, Broadcasters May Protest New Indecency Ban, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 1988, Calendar Section, at 1; see also Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102
Stat. 2186, 2228 (1988).
52. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1992).
53. Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504, 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing
Action for Children's TV v. FCC, No. 88-1916 (D.C. Cir. Jan 23, 1989)), cert. denied
sub nom. Children's Legal Found. v. Action for Children's TV, 112 S. Ct. 1281, and
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1282 (1992).

54. Id.
55. Id. at 1509.
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II court ordered the Commission to conduct a "full and fair
hearing" to determine the times at which indecent material may be
broadcast. 6
In the meantime, Congress was busy drafting another law that
would restrict broadcast indecency to the hours between midnight
and 6 a.m. on all commercial and most noncommercial stations.
Although the midnight to 6 a.m. safe harbor was declared
unconstitutional by the ACTI court, President Bush signed the bill
funding public broadcasting,57 which contained the measures
restricting broadcast indecency. The FCC was expected to
implement the new safe harbor early in 1993,58 but Action for
Children's Television obtained from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit an order staying the midnight to
6 a.m. safe harbor. In November 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit struck down the latest attempt to implement
the safe harbor provision, but later vacated the opinion and granted
a rehearing en banc 9
III. ABORTION ON THE AIR AND iN THE HOME
In the meantime, attention nationwide became riveted on the
Bailey antiabortion ads after the Indiana Republican won the May
5, 1992, primary in an upset.60 Bailey's spots included photos of
healthy infants labeled "Choice A" followed by bloody photos of
what the ad claimed were aborted fetuses, labeled "Choice B. 61
Fellow Republican congressional candidate Daniel Becker of
Georgia aired similar ads later that summer on CNN, ESPN, and

56. Id. at 1510 (quoting Action for Children's TV, 852 F.2d at 1344).
57. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 396 (West Supp. 1993)).
58. Id. § 16(a), 106 Stat. at 954.
59. Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and
reh 'g granteden banc,No. 93-1092, 1994 WL 50415 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 1994); see also
Joe Flint, Indecency Rules Under Fire in Courts at FCC, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Mar. 1, 1993, at 44.
60. Steven W. Colford, More Fetus Ads Are Coming, ADVERTISING AGE, May 18,
1992, at 18, 18.
61. Anti-Abortion TVAds Catch on in Campaigns, WASH. POST, July 20, 1992, at
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during Atlanta Braves games on Superstation WTBS.62 WTBS
Executive Vice-President and General Manager Terry Segal said
the station received hundreds of complaints from parents, who
were worried their children would see the abortion ads.6
In July, Becker submitted his ads to another Atlanta television
station, WAGA-TV, a property of Gillett Communications. Gillett
resisted running the spots and petitioned the FCC for a ruling that
would declare the ads "indecent," allowing WAGA to restrict their
broadcast to the midnight to 6 a.m. period. 4 Gillett argued that
the depictions of dead fetuses covered with "menstrual gore"
constituted "excretory" activity, thus bringing the political ad
within the definition of indecency. Gillett then asked the Commission to determine whether Section 1464 of Title 18 was an
exception to the application of Section 315(a), and if so, whether
channeling ads containing graphic pictures of aborted fetuses
would be a violation of Section 312(a)(7).6
In a letter denying Gillett's petition, Roy Stewart, chief of the
Commission's Mass Media Bureau, said that restricting commercials like Becker's would violate a candidate's right of "reasonable
access" to a broadcast station.66 Stewart said that "[a]s a general
matter, broadcasters may not direct candidates to unwanted times
of the day or evening."'6 7 Stewart said that after reviewing
Becker's ad, FCC staff found it was not indecent and that fetal
tissue, or fetuses themselves, were not "excrement. ' 68 To support
the FCC decision, Stewart said that Gillett failed to provide any
legal precedent that would bring images of aborted fetuses within
the definition of "excretory," and therefore, within the definition
of indecency. Thus, the Mass Media Bureau chief expressed
reluctance to expand that definition. Finally, since the FCC staff

62. Id.
63. Russell Shaw, Graphic Political Ads Vex Local TBS Viewers, ELECTRONIC

MEDIA,
64.
65.
66.
67.

July 20, 1992, at 8.
See Letter from Roy . Stewart to Vincent A. Pepper, supra note 7.
Id. at 5599.
Id.
Id.

68. Id. at 5600.
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did not find the ad indecent, Stewart said it was not necessary to
reach the issue of whether Section 1464 overrode Sections 315(a)
or 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act. 9
As the race came down to the last few weeks of the campaign, controversy over Becker's advertising heated up. In late
October, Becker campaign workers attempted to schedule a
thirty-minute political advertisement called Abortion in America:
The Real Story, on WAGA-TV. 70 The campaign wanted to buy
time to run the ad between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. on Sunday,
November 1.71 After reviewing the tape and seeing that it
contained about four minutes of graphic footage of an abortion
procedure, the station again contended the ad was indecent and
should not be run at the time requested.72
On Thursday, October 29, 1992, Gillett/WAGA filed suit in
the U.S. District Court in Atlanta seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.73 WAGA asked the court whether it could
"channel" the thirty-minute spot to the safe harbor hours-between
midnight and 6 a.m.-without violating the reasonable access and
anti-censorship provisions of the Communications Act. The next
day Judge Robert H. Hall declared the ad indecent and allowed
WAGA to channel it as requested.74 Judge Hall said that Section
1464, which regulates the broadcasting of indecent material,
constituted an exception to the reasonable access and anticensorship requirements of the Communications Act.75 Judge
Hall said his decision did not "significantly undercut" the purpose
of the reasonable access and anti-censorship provisions of the
Communications Act: "namely to prevent discrimination against
candidates and to allow candidates a full opportunity to relate to
76
the public their political stand.
69. Id. n.3.
70. Gillett Comm., Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, 759 (N.D. Ga. 1992), appeal
dismissed, 5 F.3d 1500 (1lth Cir. 1993).
71. Id.
72. Id.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 760.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 762.
Id.
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Becker appealed Hall's decision to the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, which referred the matter to U.S. Supreme
Court Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, who handles emergency matters in that circuit. Kennedy denied the request without
comment on Saturday, October 31, letting stand the lower court's
decision.77
On October 30, the same day that Judge Hall approved
WAGA's plan to channel Becker's ad, Roy Stewart, the FCC's
Mass Media Bureau chief, sent a letter to Daniel Becker.7 8, The
letter informed the candidate of WAGA's concern that the
broadcast of Becker's political advertisement would violate
Section 1464. Stewart acknowledged that the Commission had
never formally considered how the anti-censorship and indecency
statutes should be reconciled. However, Stewart noted that in a
1984 letter to Congressman Thomas A. Luken (D-Ohio), then-FCC
Chairman Mark Fowler wrote that "the application of both
traditional norms of statutory construction as well as an analysis
of the legislative evolution of Section 315 militates in favor of
reading Section 1464 as an exception to Section 315.""9
Stewart cautioned that because there were no definitive
guidelines, it would be reasonable for broadcasters to rely on the
informal opinion that the Commission had given to Congressman
Luken. Because of the importance of the controversy, Stewart said
the FCC was issuing a public notice seeking public comment on
the issues concerning noncensorship of political ads and indecency. In the meantime, Stewart said broadcasters could channel
to the safe harbor period political programming that the broad80
caster "in good faith believes is indecent.

77. High Court OKs Ban on TV Ads Showing Abortions, Cmi. TRIB., Nov. 2, 1992,
at 8.
78. Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to Daniel Becker, 7 FCC Red. 7282

(1992).
79. Id. (citing Letter from Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC, to Hon. Thomas A.
Luken (Jan. 19, 1984)).
80. Id. On October 30, 1992, the FCC issued a Public Notice Request for Comments
asking about the rights or obligations a broadcaster may have to channel political
advertisements he or she believes, in good faith, to be indecent. The FCC also asked for
comment on the issue of whether broadcasters have any right to channel material that,
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS

Over a period of years the courts and the FCC have adhered
closely to a position affirming the preeminence of Section 315(a)
over several other attractive positions. In refusing to yield a
politician's right to broadcast his message in the face of possible
civil unrest, the Commission has made it clear that unsettling and
even abhorrent political messages have a place in the debate of
political issues.8"
In fact, both First Amendment scholars and the U.S. Supreme
Court have acknowledged the paramount position of political
speech in the scheme of self-government. For instance, First
Amendment scholar Alexander Meildejotm carried the concept of
freedom beyond a simple lack of interference from the government: "The freedom that the First Amendment protects is not,
then, an absence of regulation. It is the presence of self-government. ' 82 The U.S. Supreme Court echoed that sentiment a few
years later, holding that "speech concerning public affairs is...
the essence of self-government. '83 The Court elaborated on that
position and extended it explicitly to political advertising in 1976
with the declaration that "it is of particular importance that
candidates have the. . . opportunity to make their views known so
that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates'
personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before
choosing among them on election day."84
Section 315(a) has also triumphed over indecency and
obscenity. On the heels of the 1978 FCC v. PacificaFoundation
decision, the Commission turned aside an attempt by Julian Bond
of the NAACP to characterize a word at least as offensive as those
while not indecent, may be otherwise harmful to children. The deadline for public
comment was January 22, 1993. Reply comments could be filed until February 23, 1993.
See In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning § 312(a)(7) of the Comm. Act,
Requestfor Comments, 7 FCC Rcd. 7297 (1992).
81. See, e.g., Letter from Ben F. Waple to Lonnie King, supra note 4, at 637.
82. Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV.
245, 252.
83. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
84. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976).
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used in Pacificaas obscene or indecent. The FCC ruled that even
if the word "nigger" were indecent or obscene, the anti-censorship
language of Section 315 prevented the Commission from taking
any action. 5
This reluctance by the FCC to expand the category of words
or materials that fits the definition of indecency was recently
affirmed. In its August 21, 1992, letter to legal counsel for
WAGA, the Commission refused to expand the definition of
indecency to include fetal tissue as "excretory" material. The
Commission said that neither the expulsion of fetal tissue nor
fetuses themselves constituted "excrement.""6 Had the FCC
expanded the scope of what constitutes indecent material, it would
have represented a significant departure from the traditional
application of the concept.
The issue of abortion pictures in political advertisements has
opened a new avenue that requires the FCC to interpret the limits
of the definition of indecency. Historically, the FCC has not found
indecency outside the realm of pandering, vulgar, or titillating
depictions of sexual or excretory activities or organs 7 Although
the Commission has classified certain explicit language as
indecent, context has often been a determining factor for finding
a violation of Section 1464. For instance, in a case involving
National Public Radio's All Things Consideredprogram, the FCC

85. Letter from Wallace E. Johnson to Julian Bond, supra note 3, at 944.
86. Letter from Roy J. Stewart to Vincent A. Pepper, supra note 7, at 5600.
87. See, e.g., In Re Applications of Palmetto Brdest. Co., Decision, 33 F.C.C. 250
(1962), recon. denied, 34 F.C.C. 1011 (1963), aff'dsub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d
534 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964). This case, known as the Charlie
Walker case, involved the use of offensive language by a disc jockey at Station WDKD
in Kingstree, South Carolina. Among the subjects requiring the Commission's action was
whether Walker had broadcast material that violated § 1464. At the time this decision
was issued, the FCC had not clearly defined indecency, but the Commission dealt with
the issue by saying that Walker had broadcast language that was "coarse, vulgar,
suggestive or susceptible of indecent double meaning." Id. para. 23.
In Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 285, recon. denied, 41
F.C.C.2d 777 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Illinois Citizens Committee for Brdcst. v. FCC, 515
F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the FCC issued a forfeiture against a radio station that aired
a program that dealt largely with sexual topics. This was the first time that the FCC said
that the discussions of sex were handled in a "titillating and pandering fashion." Id. at
290.
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refused to declare that a segment about organized crime boss John
Gotti was indecent. The Commission said that while it recognized
that the use of the word "fuck" and "fucking" throughout a
segment of a news story was patently offensive, when considered
in context the language was an integral part of a bona fide news
story. The FCC added that traditionally it had avoided intervening
in the editorial judgment of broadcast licensees on how best to
present serious public affairs programs. 8 Likewise, the Commission has refused to take action for a violation of the indecency
statute when stations have discussed sexual subjects in a serious
manner. The FCC found that a frank discussion of sexual
techniques in a program entitled Unlocking the GreatMysteries of
Sex was not intended to pander or titillate and was not otherwise
vulgar or lewd.89 In another case, however, the FCC found that
on-air vulgarities were indecent when used repeatedly by disc
jockeys who also solicited audience participation using similar
language. The Commission refused to view audience-participation
programs as serious news. This finding negated the station's claim
that the vulgar language was neither pandering nor titillating.9"
Given the emphasis the Commission has placed on context-whether a program is serious or attempts to pander and
titillate-it appears the use of graphic pictures of aborted fetuses
in political advertisements does not fit within the pattern of FCC
actions for violations of Section 1464. Moreover, the unambiguous
posture of the Supreme Court toward Section 315(a) in Farmers
weighs heavily in favor of taking the power to regulate offensive
political ads out of the hands of broadcasters. In Farmers, the
Court recognized that to give broadcasters latitude in determining

88. Letter from the FCC to Peter Branton, 6 FCC Rcd. 610 (1991); All Things
Considered Segment on John Gotti Found to Be Not Indecent, FCC Rpt. No. MM-520,
1991 FCC LEXIS 469 (Jan. 25, 1991). In June 1993 the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit held that Branton lacked standing to challenge the FCC's decision. Branton v.
FCC, 993 F.2d 906, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
89. In re Liability of Sagittarius Brdcst. Corp., Memorandum Report and Order,7
FCC Rcd. 6873, para. 7 (1992) (citing Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to Mel
Karmazin, Pres., Sagittarius Brdcst. Corp., 5 FCC Rcd. 7291, 7294 n.3 (1990)).
90. In re Liability of Goodrich Brdcst., Inc., for a Forfeiture, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 7484, para. 6 (1991).
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what should be deleted would undermine the very purpose of
Section 315.91
The issue in Farmers was whether, despite Section 315(a),
broadcasters could censor libelous remarks from a candidate's
advertisement. Although the current controversy deals with
indecency, the Court's reasoning in Farmersshould be applicable.
After all, to determine whether a political ad is indecent, a
broadcaster must first judge the content of the commercial. The
Farmers Court said that:
The decision a broadcasting station would have to make in
censoring libelous discussion by a candidate is far from easy....
Yet, under the petitioner's view of the statute [deciding whether a
statement is libelous] ... would have to be resolved by an
individual licensee during the stress of a political campaign, often,

necessarily, without adequate consideration or basis for decision.92
More recently, the FCC has been equally reluctant to rely on
broadcasters' good faith judgments to determine what is indecent.
In 1987, the FCC rejected a plea from broadcasters who asked that
reasonable licensee judgments preclude an FCC finding that
material broadcast violated the indecency provision of Section
1464. 9'
On the other hand, the issue of channeling a political ad
because it is indecent conflicts with the reasonable access requirement-Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act. In CBS, Inc.
v. FCC, Chief Justice Burger said the requirements of Section
312(a)(7) included the accommodation of a candidate's advertising
needs, as determined by the candidate. 94 Thus, under CBS,
forcing a candidate into undesirable time slots is not an accommodation of the candidate's needs, but a unilateral decision made on
other grounds by the broadcaster.
In 1980, the FCC recognized that censorship can take "many
forms besides the outright refusal . . . to broadcast a political

91. Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529
(1959).
92. Id. at 530.
93. In re Infinity Brdcst. Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order,3 FCC Red. 930,
paras. 25-27 (1987).
94. CBS, 453 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1981).
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spot."95 More recently, in its response to WAGA's request that
ads containing pictures of aborted fetuses be declared indecent, the
FCC characterized channeling as a form of censorship under
96
Section 315 that violated Section 312(a)(7).
CONCLUSIONS

The law is clear on the power of the FCC to punish broadcasters who violate the indecency statute during entertainment
programming. 97 However, when the context of the indecent
language is political advertising, broadcasters should be immune
from liability under Farmers. In addition, under the standard
applied by the Commission in the Julian Bond case 98 broadcasters have traditionally been powerless to prevent a candidate from
using offensive material in advertisements.
While Farmers precludes any censorship of an ad's content,
CBS requires that broadcasters accommodate the campaign needs
of political candidates for federal office. Despite the possible
impact that political ads depicting abortions may have on children,
Section 315(a) bans any censorship by broadcasters. This prohibition should include channeling because channeling would in fact
violate the principles affirmed in both Farmers and CBS.
Taken together, Section 312(a)(6) of the Communications Act
and 18 U.S.C. § 1464 allow the FCC to revoke a broadcaster's
license if indecency and obscenity are allowed on the air. These
statutes conflict directly with the anti-censorship mandate of
Section 315(a) of the Communications Act, however, and no
appellate court has addressed the interpretation of the conflicting
provisions. To date, the only evidence that has been arrayed
against the Farmers precedent is an informal 1984 letter99 and
95. In re Complaint of Barry Commoner and LaDonna Harris Against NBC Radio,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 10 (1980).
96. Letter from Roy J. Stewart to Vincent A. Pepper, supra note 7, at 5600.
97. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Action for Children's TV v.
FCC, 852 F.2d. 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
98. Letter from Wallace E. Johnson to Julian Bond, supra note 3.
99. Letter from Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, FCC, to Hon. Thomas A. Luken (Jan.
19, 1984), noted in Letter from Roy J. Stewart to Vincent A. Pepper, supra note 7, at
5600 n.3.

Number 2]

NNDECENT POLITICAL AD VERTISING

the district court decision involving Becker."0 Thus, until an
appellate court, or ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court, resolves the
conflict, there is no reason to fear the heavy penalties prescribed
by Section 312(a)(6) for the violation of Section 1464, particularly
given the U.S. Supreme Court's unequivocal position in Farmers.
As the previous discussion has demonstrated, broadcasters'
concerns that airing potentially indecent political ads may bring
about sanctions for violation of Section 1464 appear to be
unwarranted. On the other hand, any expansion of the definition
of indecency could lead to future incursions into that category of
speech, which broadcasters are likely to abhor.
Even though, in light of the Farmers decision, broadcasters
would not be liable for the broadcast of political ads containing
pictures of aborted fetuses, in order to be responsive to their
audience's concerns, broadcasters may want to implement some
kind of warning when political ads containing graphic pictures of
aborted fetuses are broadcast. This would allow viewers to
exercise their discretion. For instance, broadcasters could have a
twenty-second disclaimer that contains both an aural and visual
component. Once the warning is given, the picture could fade to
black before the political ad appeared on the screen.
Who would bear the cost of the additional twenty seconds is
a matter that will likely stir additional debate. Considering that it
is the choice of a political candidate to use pictures that have a
potentially harmful or disturbing impact on viewers, particularly
children, it would not be unreasonable to require candidates to
bear the cost of the warning.

100. Gillett Comm., Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ga. 1992), appeal
dismissed, 5 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993).

